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Waiver in the Court of Appeal 
 
 
The vagaries inherent in the operation of special conditions in land sale contracts 
have commonly required judicial interpretation.  A further illustration is provided 
by the recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (Jerrard, Keane JJA 
and Philip McMurdo J) in Donaldson and Donaldson v Bexton and Bexton [2006] 
QCA 559. 
 
Facts 
 
The respondent sellers agreed to sell vacant land at Canungra to the appellant 
buyers.  The contract was subject to the sale of land owned by the buyers within 
30 days.  The relevant special condition was in the following terms:  
(A) This contract is subject to and conditional upon the Buyers entering into a 
binding and enforceable contract of sale on terms satisfactory to them for the 
sale of their property located at 116 Veivers Road, Cedar Creek, Qld, 4207, 
within thirty (30) days from the date of this contract herein, failing which this 
contract will be at an end, the deposit refunded to the buyer and neither party 
will have any claim against the other apart from any rights either of the parties 
will have against the other as a result of any breach of this contract. ['the 
special condition']  
(B) In the event that subparagraph (A) is satisfied this contract is subject to 
the settlement of the sale of that property by settlement date. 
The special condition was not satisfied within the thirty (30) day period stipulated 
or subsequently.  However, on 3 January 2006 (after the thirty (30) day period 
had expired) the buyers purported to expressly waive the benefit of the special 
condition.  Two days later, on 5 January 2006, the sellers asserted that the 
contract was at an end by reason of the operation of the special condition.  The 
buyers did not accept that the contract had come to an end, and commenced 
proceedings for specific performance of the contract. 
 
Issue 
 
It was common ground that the non-fulfilment of the special condition, although 
expressed to bring the contract to “an end”, simply rendered the contract 
voidable by either party provided they had not contributed to the non-fulfilment of 
the condition.  However, the issue which arose for determination on the appeal 
was whether the right of termination which arose in the sellers upon the non-
fulfilment of the condition was lost because the buyers indicated to the sellers 
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that the buyers wished to complete the contract before the sellers purported to 
terminate the contract. 
 
It was contended by the buyers that as the special condition was a provision for 
their benefit, they were entitled to unilaterally waive the benefit of the clause.  In 
response, the sellers argued that non-compliance with the special condition 
made the contract voidable thereby validating their subsequent termination of the 
contract. 
 
The Result 
 
In a split decision (McMurdo J dissenting) the Court of Appeal held that the 
language of the special condition clearly expressed the contractual intention of 
the parties that the sellers should be released from the contract if the condition 
was not fulfilled.  That the buyers might have prevented that outcome by waiving 
the condition before its expiration was no reason to reform the parties' rights 
under the contract.  The separate judgments warrant further consideration. 
 
Jerrard JA 
 
Jerrard JA rejected the suggestion that the buyers could waive the benefit of the 
special condition after the expiry of the stipulated 30 day period.  After the date 
for completion of the condition had expired, Jerrard JA opined that waiver 
became irrelevant as there was nothing to waive.  Rather, it was simply that the 
buyers agreed to the contract binding them as buyers without that condition. 
 
However, notwithstanding that the buyers may wish to proceed, Jerrard JA 
opined that the sellers still had an interest in a exercising a right to end the 
contract.  This was because the buyers had already shown uncertainty about 
their capacity to pay for the property.  Jerrard JA noted that recent decisions of 
the High Court have emphasised that parties are bound by the terms of the 
contract into which they enter, as understood by a reasonable person, taking into 
account the surrounding circumstances known to the parties and the purpose 
and object of the transaction.  Adopting this approach, a reasonable person 
would consider the language used in the special condition to permit the sellers to 
have an equal right to end the contract for non-performance of the condition. 
 
Keane JA 
 
Like Jerrard JA, Keane JA considered that the issue in dispute must be 
answered by reference to the contractual intention of the parties.  In this regard, 
Keane JA opined that the parties could not have expressed more clearly their 
intention that failure of the condition rendered the contract voidable by either 
party.  Accordingly the only question remaining was whether the sellers’ right of 
avoidance could be defeated by the indication by the buyers of their wish to 
complete the contract.  After examining the authorities at some length, Keane JA 
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did not consider the circumstance that the special condition was inserted for the 
benefit only of the purchaser to be determinative: 
 
 
 Once it is accepted, as it must be in this case, that non-fulfilment of a condition 
confers a right of termination on either party, then the circumstance that the 
special condition was inserted for the benefit only of the purchaser does not 
render the right of the vendor vulnerable to terminate to a higher right in the 
purchaser to keep the contract on foot. To hold otherwise is, in my respectful 
opinion, distinctly contrary to the decision in Gange v Sullivan where the joint 
judgment said:" … non-fulfilment of the condition could, in the absence of default 
contributing thereto, be relied upon by either party as a ground for determining 
the contract."  (at [22]) 
 
Keane JA also rejected the suggestion that the buyers could “waive” the 
condition after the expiry of the stipulated thirty (30) day period: 
 
  … the suggestion that what is involved here is a "waiver" at all involves a 
confusion of concepts. The question is not whether the benefit of the condition 
may be waived after it has failed. The question is whether the right of termination 
which has arisen under the contract in favour of the vendor may be defeated, not 
by disentitling conduct on the vendor's part but by the mere expression by the 
purchaser of a wish to complete notwithstanding the failure of the condition. (at 
[53]) 
 
By way of answer to this question, Keane JA noted that there was no authority 
supporting the conclusion that the language of the special condition was apt to 
deny the sellers the exercise of a right of termination which had arisen in favour 
of both parties simply because the buyers indicated a wish to complete the 
contract, before the sellers exercised their right of termination.  In Keane JA’s 
view, any other result would not accord with the parties’ bargain: 
 
 The language of the special condition was so clear that there can be no doubt 
that both parties well understood that, in the events which happened in this case, 
neither party could insist on the completion of the contract against the wish of the 
other. The courts should be wary of defeating the clearly expressed contractual 
intention of the parties by reference to judicial views as to what the parties should 
be content to accept. In the present case, the terms of the parties' bargain 
expressly released the respondents from the binding force of the contract in the 
events which happened. That the appellants might have prevented that outcome 
by waiving the condition before its expiration is no reason for the court to reform 
the parties' rights under the contract. Such an outcome cannot be justified as a 
matter of interpretation of the parties' bargain. It can only be justified by a 
process of judicial control of the parties' bargain by judicial inference as to the 
extent of the parties' legitimate interests to override the parties' clearly expressed 
intentions. As Francis Bacon said: "Judges must beware of hard constructions 
and strained inferences, for there is no worse torture than the torture of laws.” 
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McMurdo J (dissenting) 
 
On the strength of existing High Court authority, McMurdo J noted that it was 
common ground that within the 30 day period provided for in the special 
condition, the buyers would have been able to waive the benefit of the condition.  
It was also common ground that if the condition was not fulfilled or waived by the 
buyers within that period, each of the parties became entitled to terminate the 
contract as soon as the period expired.  However, McMurdo J went on to observe 
that the existing authorities had not involved the precise question in this case, 
which was the effect of a purported waiver by the buyers after the period for 
fulfillment of the special condition but prior to any termination by the sellers. 
 
Where the judgment of McMurdo J departs from that of the majority judgments is 
his treatment of existing authorities concerning the issue of waiver.  McMurdo 
JA’s approach is well illustrated by the following excerpt: 
 
The basis for a right of waiver remains just as relevant, after the date for 
fulfilment of the condition, as it had been before that date. It remains a condition 
which is primarily for the purchaser’s benefit. Each party has a right to terminate 
for the non-fulfilment of the condition, but it is apparent that those rights serve 
different interests. The purchaser’s interest is that it might be impossible or too 
onerous for the purchaser to complete without the benefit of a sale of his own 
property. The non-fulfilment of the condition does not concern the vendor in the 
same way, because the vendor’s ability to complete the contract is entirely 
unaffected by it. The non-fulfilment of the condition concerns the vendor because 
it permits the purchaser to avoid, and the vendor’s right to terminate is to meet 
what would otherwise be his predicament that his property would remain subject 
to a contract which the purchaser could at any time avoid. But if the purchaser 
can waive the condition and become unconditionally bound, the vendor’s 
uncertainty is resolved and the purpose for the vendor’s right of termination no 
longer exists. (at [85]) 
 
Adopting this approach, McMurdo J, unlike the majority, was prepared to allow 
the appeal and order that the contract be specifically performed. 
 
Comment 
 
This case serves as a further illustration of the need for careful drafting of special 
conditions in land sale contracts.  While the approach evidenced in the dissenting 
judgment of McMurdo J may well be seen to accurately reflect the differing 
interests of the buyer and the seller, the strictures imposed by the parties’ 
contractual intentions were predominant in the majority judgments.  To resolve all 
uncertainty, rights of waiver (before the expiration of any stipulated period) or 
rights of affirmation (after the expiration of any stipulated period) should be the 
subject of express provision.  Special conditions should clearly stipulate which 
party (or parties) may exercise such rights, the time period within which such 
rights are to be exercised and the consequences if such rights are not exercised. 
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